Oblivious equilibrium is a new solution concept for approximating Markov perfect equilibrium in dynamic models of imperfect competition among heterogeneous firms and has recently been used in multiple economic studies. In this paper, we present algorithms for computing oblivious equilibrium and for bounding approximation error. We report results from computational case studies that serve to assess both efficiency of the algorithms and accuracy of oblivious equilibrium as an approximation to Markov perfect equilibrium. We also extend the definition of oblivious equilibrium, originally proposed for models with only firm-specific idiosyncratic random shocks, and our algorithms to accommodate models with industry-wide aggregate shocks. Our results suggest that, by using oblivious equilibrium to approximate Markov perfect equilibrium, it is possible to greatly increase the set of dynamic models of imperfect competition that can be analyzed computationally. * We have had very helpful conversations with
Introduction
Many phenomena observed in industrial competition are most appropriately analyzed through dynamic models. Examples include investments in R&D or capacity, advertising, the entry and exit of firms, tacit collusion, consumer learning, and learning-by-doing. In each of these examples, dynamics play an important role because firms make decisions based on longer term rather than immediate profit opportunities. To promote applied economic research on how dynamics shape industries, Ericson and Pakes (1995) (hereafter EP) introduced a class of dynamic models of imperfect competition which have since received much attention.
In an EP-type model, each firm is distinguished by a firm state, which evolves over an infinite time horizon. This firm state may reflect, for example, a firm's relative advantage in the marketplace gained through successful advertising or R&D initiatives. The industry state encodes the number of firms in each possible firm state. At each time, firms compete in the market and each receives profits that depends on the industry state as well as its own firm state. At each time, each firm makes a decision based on its firm state and the industry state, and its subsequent firm state is determined by the current state, the current decision, and a random shock. Decision strategies are identical across firms and characterized by Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). 1 EP-type models hold great promise as tools for empirical work, as new econometric methods offer effective ways for estimating model parameters from industry data. 2 Estimated models can be used, for example, to predict the impact of a change in government regulations by computing and comparing MPE under different policy regimes. A concrete example is given by (Benkard 2004 ) which estimates a model of the wide-bodied commercial aircraft industry and then computes and analyzes MPE under different policy regimes to offer evidence that an anti-trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing.
The aforementioned work is just one example from a growing number of papers that estimate and/or analyze EP-type models. 3 However, this line of work has largely been restricted to models with relatively few -say, two to six, and in many cases only two -firms. This rules out most real world industries. The obstacle to analyzing models with larger numbers of firms is the complexity of computing MPE, as we will now explain.
In this literature, MPE are computed using iterative dynamic programming algorithms (e.g., Pakes and McGuire (1994) ). Such algorithms are not guaranteed to converge, but positive practical experience supports their use. As is typically the case with dynamic programming algorithms, computational requirements grow with the number of states. In the context of EP-type models, the relevant states are those driving firm decisions, and their number grows with that of industry states. For a model with 20 firms and 40 firm states, there are quadrillions of industry states. This renders dynamic programming infeasible. Since most industries observe more than 20 competing firms, computational requirements severely restrict the applicability of EP-type models. Even where applications are feasible, model formulation is driven as much by computational considerations as economic ones.
There is great interest in reducing computational requirements associated with the analysis of EP-type models. Judd (1998) , Pakes and McGuire (2001) , and Doraszelski and Judd (2003) have proposed approaches that accelerate MPE computation which are capable of addressing models with several additional firms. In this paper, we take a different tack and consider algorithms that can efficiently deal with any number of firms but aim to compute an approximation rather than an exact MPE and to bound its error. Our view is that for most models of practical interest, exact computation of MPE is unlikely to ever become feasible, and given that, approximations may offer the best available guidance for policy and strategy decisions.
What we will present complements a companion paper (Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy 2007b) in which we introduced the notion of an oblivious equilibrium (OE) as an approximation to MPE. In an OE, each firm makes decisions based only on its firm state and the long run average industry state, while ignoring the current industry state. The main result of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) establishes conditions under which OE well-approximates MPE asymptotically as the market size grows. Intuitively, in a large market the random evolution of individual firms can average out in such a way that variations in the normalized industry state are small and bear little impact on profits. Given this, firms can make near-optimal decisions based on the average rather than the current industry state.
The primary motivation for considering OE is that they may be much easier to compute than MPE because the states driving a firm's decisions need to encode only the firm state but not the industry state. In this paper, we develop an iterative dynamic programming algorithm for computing OE and demonstrate its efficiency through computational experiments; it is able to compute OE within a few minutes on a common laptop computer even for industries with thousands of firms. In addition, we develop an efficient simulationbased algorithm that computes a bound on approximation error. Error here is measured in terms of the expected incremental value that an individual firm in the industry can capture by unilaterally deviating from OE.
The result of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) supports use of OE as an approximation to MPE in a certain asymptotic regime. It is natural to wonder whether OE provide close approximations to MPE for problem instances of practical interest. This issue is addressed in this paper through a computational study.
The algorithm for bounding approximation error figures prominently in this study, as it allows us to verify accuracy of OE as an approximation for each problem instance in the study. What we find is that OE offer useful approximations for many relevant models of industries involving hundreds of firms, and in some cases even tens of firms. This suggests that OE opens the door to a much broader range of applications for EP-type models. Indeed, our algorithms have already been applied in an empirical study of R&D investment in the Korean electric motor industry (Xu 2006) and in a conceptual study of the effects of competition policy on innovation (Hashmi 2006) . We have also done a computational study to determine conditions under which an industry becomes fragmented or remains concentrated as the market size grows (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2005a) .) These studies would not have been possible using exact computation of MPE.
The model considered in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) allows only for random shocks that are idiosyncratic across firms. In many cases of practical interest, it is desirable to additionally incorporate in the model aggregate random shocks that are common to all firms. Such an extension is important, for example, when analyzing the dynamic effects of industry-wide business cycles. An additional contribution of this paper is to extend the model as well as algorithms for computing OE and error bounds to treat aggregate shocks.
It is worth mentioning that for many cases of practical interest, OE may not offer an accurate approximation. As such, there is a need for further development of approximation methods. In a sense, OE represents a simple first step in this effort. It is encouraging that this simple approximation has proven useful in many cases, and this motivates further work to design extensions that address additional cases. Some work along these lines is presented in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007a) .
More broadly, it is our belief that operations researchers can contribute greatly to methods for analysis of modern economic models such as those of the EP type. As more data becomes available, complex models are emerging that increasingly rely on advanced computational methods from areas such as numerical optimization, dynamic programming, and simulation. Operations researchers are at the forefront in development of these areas and are therefore positioned to make advances in how these economic models are analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the dynamic industry model. In Section 3 we introduce the concept of oblivious strategies and oblivious equilibrium. In Section 4 we provide methods for computing OE and error bounds. In Section 5 we report results from computational experiments. In Section 6 we extend OE to treat a model with aggregate shocks. Section 7 presents conclusions and a discussion of future research directions.
A Dynamic Model of Imperfect Competition
In this section we formulate a model of an industry in which firms compete in a single-good market. The model is based on Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) , which in turn, is close in spirit to Ericson and Pakes (1995) . The model is general enough to encompass numerous applied problems in economics.
Indeed, a blossoming recent literature on EP-type models has applied similar models to advertising, auctions, collusion, consumer learning, environmental policy, international trade policy, learning-by-doing, limit order markets, mergers, network externalities, and other applied problems.
Model and Notation
The industry evolves over discrete time periods and an infinite horizon. We index time periods with nonnegative integers t ∈ N (N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}). All random variables are defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P) equipped with a filtration {F t : t ≥ 0}. We adopt a convention of indexing by t variables that are
Each firm that enters the industry is assigned a unique positive integer-valued index. The set of indices of incumbent firms at time t is denoted by S t . Firm heterogeneity is reflected through firm states. To fix an interpretation, we will refer to a firm's state as its quality level. However, firm states might more generally reflect productivity, capacity, the size of its consumer network, or any other aspect of the firm that affects its profits. At time t, the quality level of firm i ∈ S t is denoted by x it ∈ N.
We define the industry state s t to be a vector over quality levels that specifies, for each quality level x ∈ N, the number of incumbent firms at quality level x in period t. We define the state space S = s ∈ N ∞ ∞ x=0 s(x) < ∞ . Though in principle there are a countable number of industry states, we will also consider an extended state space S = s ∈ ∞ + ∞ x=0 s(x) < ∞ . For each i ∈ S t , we define s −i,t ∈ S to be the state of the competitors of firm i; that is, s −i,t (x) = s t (x) − 1 if x it = x, and
In each period, each incumbent firm earns profits on a spot market. A firm's single period expected profit π(x it , s −i,t ) depends on its quality level x it ∈ N and its competitors' state s −i,t ∈ S.
The model also allows for entry and exit. In each period, each incumbent firm i ∈ S t observes a positive real-valued sell-off value φ it that is private information to the firm. If the sell-off value exceeds the value of continuing in the industry then the firm may choose to exit, in which case it earns the sell-off value and then ceases operations permanently.
If the firm instead decides to remain in the industry, then it can invest to improve its quality level. If a firm invests ι it ∈ + , then the firm's state at time t + 1 is given by,
where the function w captures the impact of investment on quality and ζ i,t+1 reflects uncertainty in the outcome of investment. Uncertainty may arise, for example, due to the risk associated with a research and development endeavor or a marketing campaign. Note that this specification is very general as w may take on either positive or negative values (e.g., allowing for positive depreciation). We denote the unit cost of investment by d.
In each period new firms can enter the industry by paying a setup cost κ. Entrants do not earn profits in the period that they enter. They appear in the following period at state x e ∈ N and can earn profits thereafter. 4 Each firm aims to maximize expected net present value. The interest rate is assumed to be positive and constant over time, resulting in a constant discount factor of β ∈ (0, 1) per time period.
In each period, events occur in the following order:
1. Each incumbent firms observes its sell-off value and then makes exit and investment decisions.
2. The number of entering firms is determined and each entrant pays an entry cost of κ.
3. Incumbent firms compete in the spot market and receive profits.
4. Exiting firms exit and receive their sell-off values.
5. Investment outcomes are determined, new entrants enter, and the industry takes on a new state s t+1 .
Model Primitives
Our model above allows for a wide variety of applied problems. To study any particular problem it is necessary to further specify the primitives of the model, including:
4 Note that it would not change any of our results to assume that the entry state was a random variable.
profit function
entry cost κ discount factor β Note that in most applications the profit function would not be specified directly, but would instead result from a deeper set of primitives that specify a demand function, a cost function, and a static equilibrium concept.
Assumptions
We make several assumptions about the model primitives, beginning with the profit function.
Assumption 2.1.
2. For all x ∈ N and s ∈ S, π(x, s) > 0, and sup x,s π(x, s) < ∞.
The assumptions are natural. Assumption 2.1.1 ensures that increases in quality lead to increases in profit. Assumption 2.1.2 ensures that profits are positive and bounded.
We also make assumptions about investment and the distributions of the private shocks: Assumption 2.2.
1. The variables {φ it |t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1} are i.i.d. and have finite expectations and well-defined density functions with support + .
2. The random variables {ζ it |t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1} are i.i.d. and independent of {φ it |t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1}.
3. For all ζ, w(ι, ζ) is nondecreasing in ι.
5. There exists a positive constant w ∈ N such that |w(ι, ζ)| ≤ w, for all (ι, ζ). There exists a positive constant ι such that ι it < ι, ∀i, ∀t.
6. For all k ∈ {−w, . . . , w}, P[w(ι, ζ i,t+1 ) = k] is continuous in ι.
7. The transitions generated by w(ι, ζ) are unique investment choice admissible .
Again the assumptions are natural and fairly weak. Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2003) that ensures a unique solution to the firms' investment decision problem. It is used to guarantee existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, and is satisfied by many of the commonly used specifications in the literature.
We assume that there are an asymptotically large number of potential entrants who play a symmetric mixed entry strategy. This results in a Poisson-distributed number of entrants (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) for a derivation of this result). Our associated modeling assumptions are as follows:
Assumption 2.3.
1. The number of firms entering during period t is a Poisson random variable that is conditionally independent of {φ it , ζ it |t ≥ 0, i ≥ 1}, conditioned on s t .
2. κ > β ·φ, whereφ is the expected net present value of entering the market, investing zero and earning zero profits each period, and then exiting at an optimal stopping time.
We denote the expected number of firms entering at industry state s t , by λ(s t ). This state-dependent entry rate will be endogenously determined, and our solution concept will require that it satisfies a zero expected profit condition. Modeling the number of entrants as a Poisson random variable has the advantage that it leads to simpler dynamics. However, our results can accommodate other entry processes as well.
Assumption 2.3.2 ensures that the sell-off value by itself is not sufficient reason to enter the industry.
Equilibrium
As a model of industry behavior we focus on pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), in the sense of Maskin and Tirole (1988) . We further assume that equilibrium is symmetric, such that all firms use a common stationary investment/exit strategy. In particular, there is a function ι such that at each time t, each incumbent firm i ∈ S t invests an amount ι it = ι(x it , s −i,t ). Similarly, each firm follows an exit strategy that takes the form of a cutoff rule: there is a real-valued function ρ such that an incumbent firm i ∈ S t exits at time t if and only if φ it ≥ ρ(x it , s −i,t ). In Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) we show that there always exists an optimal exit strategy of this form even among very general classes of exit strategies. Let M denote the set of exit/investment strategies such that an element µ ∈ M is a pair of functions µ = (ι, ρ),
where ι : N × S → + is an investment strategy and ρ : N × S → + is an exit strategy. Similarly, we denote the set of entry rate functions by Λ, where an element of Λ is a function λ : S → + .
We define the value function V (x, s|µ , µ, λ) to be the expected net present value for a firm at state x when its competitors' state is s, given that its competitors each follows a common strategy µ ∈ M, the entry rate function is λ ∈ Λ, and the firm itself follows strategy µ ∈ M. In particular,
where i is taken to be the index of a firm at quality level x at time t, τ i is a random variable representing the time at which firm i exits the industry, and the subscripts of the expectation indicate the strategy followed by firm i, the strategy followed by its competitors, and the entry rate function. In an abuse of notation, we will use the shorthand, V (x, s|µ, λ) ≡ V (x, s|µ, µ, λ), to refer to the expected discounted value of profits when firm i follows the same strategy µ as its competitors.
An equilibrium to our model comprises an investment/exit strategy µ = (ι, ρ) ∈ M, and an entry rate function λ ∈ Λ that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Incumbent firm strategies represent a MPE:
2. At each state, either entrants have zero expected profits or the entry rate is zero (or both):
In Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) , we show that the supremum in part 1 of the definition above can always be attained simultaneously for all x and s by a common strategy µ . Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2003) 
Oblivious Equilibrium
In Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) we propose a method for approximating MPE based on the idea that when there are a large number of firms, simultaneous changes in individual firm quality levels can average out such that the industry state remains roughly constant over time. In this setting, each firm can potentially make near-optimal decisions based only on its own quality level and the long run average industry state. With this motivation, we consider restricting firm strategies so that each firm's decisions depend only on the firm's quality level. We call such restricted strategies oblivious since they involve decisions made without full knowledge of the circumstances -in particular, the state of the industry.
LetM ⊂ M andΛ ⊂ Λ denote the set of oblivious strategies and the set of oblivious entry rate functions. Since each strategy µ = (ι, ρ) ∈M generates decisions ι(x, s) and ρ(x, s) that do not depend on s, with some abuse of notation, we will often drop the second argument and write ι(x) and ρ(x). Similarly,
for an entry rate function λ ∈Λ, we will denote by λ the real-valued entry rate that persists for all industry states.
Note that if all firms use a common strategy µ ∈M, the quality level of each evolves as an independent transient Markov chain. Let the k-period transition sub-probabilities of this transient Markov chain be denoted by P k µ (x, y). Then, the expected time that a firm spends at a quality level x is given by
, and the expected lifespan of a firm is
. Denote the expected number of firms at quality level x at time t bys t (x) = E[s t (x)]. The following result offers an expression for the long-run expected industry state when dynamics are governed by oblivious strategies and entry rate functions.
Lemma 3.1. Let Assumption 2.2 hold. If firms make decisions according to an oblivious strategy µ ∈M and enter according to an oblivious entry rate function λ ∈Λ, and the expected time that a firm spends in the industry is finite, then
for all x ∈ N.
We omit the proof, which is straightforward. To abbreviate notation, we lets µ,λ (x) = lim t→∞st (x) for µ ∈M, λ ∈Λ, and x ∈ N. For an oblivious strategy µ ∈M and an oblivious entry rate function λ ∈Λ we define an oblivious value functioñ
This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of a firm that is at quality level x and follows oblivious strategy µ , under the assumption that its competitors' state will bes µ,λ for all time. Note that only the firm's own strategy µ influences the firm's state trajectory because neither the profit function nor the strategy µ depends on the industry state. Hence, the subscript in the expectation only reflects this dependence. Importantly, however, the oblivious value function remains a function of the competitors' strategy µ and the entry rate λ through the expected industry states µ,λ . Again, we abuse notation by usingṼ (x|µ, λ) ≡Ṽ (x|µ, µ, λ) to refer to the oblivious value function when firm i follows the same strategy µ as its competitors.
We now define a new solution concept: an oblivious equilibrium consists of a strategy µ ∈M and an entry rate function λ ∈Λ that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Firm strategies optimize an oblivious value function:
2. Either the oblivious expected value of entry is zero or the entry rate is zero (or both):
It is straightforward to show that OE exists under mild technical conditions. Furthermore, if the entry cost is not prohibitively high then an OE with a positive entry rate exists. We omit the proof of this for brevity. With respect to uniqueness, we have been unable to find multiple OE in any of the applied problems we have considered, but similarly with the case of MPE, we have no reason to believe that in general there is a unique OE. 6 Finally, in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) we show that when strategies and entry rate functions are oblivious, the Markov process {s t : t ≥ 0} admits a unique invariant distribution. Moreover, we show that, when firms play OE strategies, the invariant distribution of the industry state is such that the number of firms in each state x ∈ N is given by a Poisson random variable with means µ,λ (x), independent across states x ∈ N.
Computational Methods
In this section we propose an algorithm to solve for OE. We then derive expressions that can be computed via simulation and that bound approximation error associated with a particular OE. While the asymptotic results in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) provide conditions under which the approximation will work well as the market size grows, the error bound can be used to evaluate the OE as an approximation for MPE for a particular set of model primitives.
Computing Oblivious Equilibria
Algorithm 1 (below) is designed to compute an OE. It starts with two extreme entry rates: λ = 0 and
+φ . Under mild assumptions, any oblivious equilibrium entry rate must lie between these two extremes. The algorithm searches over entry rates between these two extremes for one that leads to an OE. 7 For each candidate entry rate λ, an inner loop (steps 6-10) computes an OE firm strategy for that fixed entry rate. Strategies are updated "smoothly" (step 9). 8 If the termination conditions of both the inner and outer loops are satisfied with 1 = 2 = 0, we have an OE. Small values of 1 and 2 allow for small errors associated with limitations of numerical precision.
The algorithm is easy to program and computationally efficient. In each iteration of the inner loop, the optimization problem to be solved is a one dimensional dynamic program. The state space in this dynamic program is the set of quality levels a firm can achieve. In principle, there could be an infinite number of them. However, beyond a certain quality level the optimal strategy for a firm is not to invest, so its quality cannot increase to beyond that level. In the numerical experiments we present in Section 5, the state space never had more than two hundred states per firm. The exact number of states is determined during execution of the algorithm. Choose µ * ∈M to maximizeṼ (x|µ * , µ, λ) simultaneously for all x ∈ N 8:
∆ := µ * − µ ∞ ; n := n + 1 9:
if βṼ (x e |µ, λ) − κ ≥ 0 then λ := λ 15:
Whether this algorithm is guaranteed to terminate in a finite number of iterations remains an open issue.
However, in over 90% of the numerical experiments we present in the next section, it converged in less than five minutes (and often much less than this). In the rest, it converged in less than fifteen minutes. 9
Error Bounds
To bound approximation error, we first need to define what is meant by approximation error. Consider an oblivious strategy and entry rate function (μ,λ) ∈M ×Λ. We assume that the initial industry state s 0 is sampled from the invariant distribution of {s t : t ≥ 0}. Hence, s t is a stationary process; s t is distributed according to its invariant distribution for all t ≥ 0. We will quantify approximation error at each firm state
The expectation is over the invariant distribution of s t . Hence, approximation error is the amount by which a firm at state x ∈ N can improve its expected net present value by unilaterally deviating from the OE strategyμ, and instead following an optimal (non-oblivious) best response. Recall that a MPE requires that the expression in square brackets equals zero for all states (x, s). Approximation error instead considers the benefit of deviating to an optimal strategy starting from each firm state x, averaged over the invariant distribution of industry states. It would not be possible to obtain useful bounds point-wise. This is because in an OE firms may be making poor decisions in states that are far from the expected state. Offsetting this effect is the fact that these states have very low probability of occurrence, so they have a small impact on expected discounted profits. The idea is that when approximation error is small MPE strategies and entry rates at relevant states should be well approximated by oblivious ones. In Section 5 we present computational results that support this point. 10 The next theorem provides two bounds on the approximation error. Recall thats is the long run expected state in OE (E[s t ]). Let a x (y) be the expected discounted sum of an indicator of visits to state y for a firm starting at state x that uses strategyμ. Let [x] + = max(x, 0). Theorem 4.1. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any OE (μ,λ) and firm state x ∈ N,
where ∆|π|(s) = max y∈N |π(y, s) − π(y,s)|, and
where ∆ A π(s) = max y∈A (π(y, s) − π(y,s)).
The derivation of these bounds can be found in the Appendix. It is worth mentioning that the result can be generalized a great deal. In particular, many of the prior assumptions can be dropped; for instance, most alternative entry processes will not change the result.
The first bound is simpler so we will use it to provide an explanation of the main steps of the derivation here. First, we compare the value functions in the definition of approximation error through the OE value function. Formally,
where µ * ∈ M is a Markovian (non-oblivious) best response to an OE (μ,λ) for a firm that is keeping track of the industry state. We now explain how we bound the first expectation in the right-hand side above. A similar argument can be used for the second one. First, we observe that becauseμ andλ attain an OE, for
where the last equation follows because there will always be an optimal oblivious strategy when optimizing an oblivious value function even if we consider more general strategies (a key feature of oblivious strategies).
Hence,
where µ * ∈ M achieves the supremum in equation (4.3). Note that in the right-hand side of the above inequality both value functions are evaluated at the same set of strategies. This allows us to compare V (x, s|µ * ,μ,λ) withṼ (x|μ,λ) by only taking into consideration the difference between single-period profits (actual versus oblivious). The quantities associated with the difference between strategies (µ * versusμ)
can be neglected. Hence, using the previous inequality we obtain that the difference between value functions can be bounded by a discounted sum of expected differences between actual and oblivious single-period profits as required by the error bounds. To obtain a bound that does not depend on µ * , we use the fact that under OE strategies firms' trajectories are independent.
By doing a more careful account on profits' differences we obtain the second bound which is tighter.
Note that the right-hand-side of the second bound depends on the initial firm state x, whereas the right-handside of the first bound does not.
Both bounds can be easily estimated via simulation algorithms. Computing the bounds involves computing expectations over the industry state s t under its invariant distribution. Once the OE has been computed, the industry state has a known distribution, namely, the product form of Poisson random variables with means (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) ). In particular, note that the bounds are not a function of the true MPE or even of the optimal non-oblivious best response strategy. Computing either of these strategies could require solving a high-dimensional dynamic program.
In our computational experiments, we will use a tighter bound which explicitly uses the fact that a firm can change by at most w quality units per time period.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any OE (μ,λ), firm state x ∈ N,
The derivation of this bound can be found in the Appendix. The bound uses the fact that a firm in state x at time t can only be in a state in the set {x(k), ..., x + (k − t)w} at time k ≥ t. Recall that a firm state is a natural number, therefore, x it ≥ 0, ∀i, t. In general, π(y, s) − π(y,s) is increasing in y. Therefore, if w is small (e.g. in many applications of EP models w = 1), we expect error bound (4.4) to be much tighter than error bound (4.2). Even tighter bounds can be derived for industries where there is no exit of incumbent firms and no entry of new firms as we describe in the following subsection.
Error Bounds for Industries with No Exit and No Entry
Consider an industry that at time t = 0 starts with a positive number of incumbent firms and where there is a constant sell-off value equal to zero and a very high entry cost. As a result, in this industry there will be no exit of incumbent firms and no entry of new firms; the number of firms in the industry will remain constant.
Error bounds tighter than the ones in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 can be derived in this case. Then, for any OE (μ,λ) and firm state x ∈ N,
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Note that compared to the bounds in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, here we do not need to take the positive part of ∆ · π(s t ).
Computational Experiments
In this section we conduct some computational experiments to evaluate how OE performs in practice. We begin with the model to be analyzed. The model is similar to Pakes and McGuire (1994) . However, it differs in the entry and exit processes, in the demand system, and in that we do not consider an aggregate shock.
The Computational Model
SINGLE-PERIOD PROFIT FUNCTION. We consider an industry with differentiated products, where each firm's state variable represents the quality of its product. There are m consumers in the market. In period t, consumer j receives utility u ijt from consuming the good produced by firm i given by:
where Y is the consumer's income, p it is the price of the good produced by firm i, and ψ is a scaling factor. ν ijt are i.i.d. random variables distributed Gumbel that represent unobserved characteristics for each consumer-good pair. There is also an outside good that provides consumers zero utility. We assume consumers buy at most one product each period and that they choose the product that maximizes utility.
Under these assumptions our demand system is a classical logit model.
Let N (x it , p it ) = exp(θ 1 ln(
. Then, the expected market share of each firm is given by:
We assume that firms set prices in the spot market. If there is a constant marginal cost c, the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game satisfies the first-order conditions,
There is a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, denoted p * t (Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) ). Expected profits are given by:
SELL-OFF PRICE. φ it are i.i.d. exponential random variables with mean K. TRANSITION DYNAMICS. A firm's investment is successful with probability aι 1+aι , in which case the quality of its product increases by one level. The firm's product depreciates one quality level with probability δ, independently each period. Note that our model differs from Pakes and McGuire (1994) here because the depreciation shocks in our model are idiosyncratic. Combining the investment and depreciation processes, it follows that the transition probabilities for a firm in state x that invests ι are given by:
if y = x − 1 .
Numerical Results: Behavior of the Bound
Our first set of results investigate the behavior of the approximation error bound under several different model specifications. A wide range of parameters for our model could reasonably represent different real world industries of interest. In practice the parameters would either be estimated using data from a particular industry or chosen to reflect an industry under study. We begin by investigating a particular set of representative parameter values. Following Pakes and McGuire (1994) we fix a = 3 and δ = 0.7. Additionally, we fix marginal cost at c = 0.5, income at Y = 1, θ 2 = 0.5, and ψ = 1. The discount factor is β = 0.95. The entry cost is κ = 35 and the entry state is x e = 10. The average sell-off value is K = 10. In this case, β · φ < κ, so the sell-off value by itself is not sufficient reason to enter the industry (Assumption 2.3.2).
Additionally, both sell-off values and entry costs are substantially larger than marginal costs, consistent with empirical evidence.
In our computational experiments we found that the most important parameter affecting the approximation error bounds was θ 1 , which determines the importance that consumers place on product quality. If θ 1 is small, the degree of vertical differentiation between products is small. This reduces the impact of changes in the industry state on profits, making the MPE strategies less sensitive to the industry state. Additionally, when θ 1 is small it turns out that the invariant distributions is very "light-tailed". Oblivious strategies work well in this case, and the approximation error bound is small. If θ 1 is large, we get the reverse implications and the approximation error bound is larger.
Based on these experiments, here we consider two different values of θ 1 and the investment cost d:
(θ 1 , d): (0.1, 0.1) and (0.5, 0.5). The former ("Low") is a situation where the level of vertical differentiation is low and it is inexpensive to invest to improve quality. The latter ("High") is the opposite. As a point of comparison, if a firm increases its state from x = 10 to x = 20, its single-period profits increase by 7% and 40% respectively in the two cases (holding competitors constant).
For each set of parameters, we use the approximation error bound in Theorem 4.2 to compute an upper bound on the percentage error in the value function,
, where (μ,λ) are the OE strategy and entry rate, respectively, and the expectations are taken with respect to s. We estimate the expectations using simulation. 11 We compute the previously mentioned percentage approximation error bound for different market sizes. As the market size increases, the expected number of firms increases and the approximation error bound decreases.
In Figure 1 (see the Appendix for all tables and figures) we present the percentage approximation error bound as a function of the expected number of firms for the two levels of vertical differentiation (the two curves are obtained by varying the market size). For the low vertical differentiation case it takes around 150 firms to bring the bound down to 3%, and 250 firms to bring it to 2%. For the high case it takes around 250 firms to bring the bound to 4% and 1000 firms to bring it to 2%.
When the level of vertical differentiation is high, the number of firms required to have a good approximation is large, requiring hundreds and even thousands of firms. The approximation would be better if the industry state s were always close to its mean,s. One aspect of the model that interferes with this is the Poisson entry process, which leads to a large amount of variability in the number of firms inside the industry. Recall that we chose to model the entry process this way because it simplified the dynamics. However, the expressions for the approximation error bounds remain correct for a wide range of entry models. To investigate this issue further, as an alternative, we tried using an entry process where the number of entrants each period is "almost deterministic", but still satisfies a zero profits condition. 12 This entry process implies a smaller variability in the number of firms. Figure 2 presents the results with the new entry process. In the case of low vertical differentiation, the approximation error bound is around 3% with just 60 firms, around 2% with 125 firms, and around 1% with 400 firms. When the level of vertical differentiation is high the approximation error bound is around 4% when there are 125 firms and around 2% for 500 firms. 11 The expected value function is estimated with a relative precision of 1% and a confidence level of 98%. The bound is estimated with a relative precision of at most 10% and a confidence level of 98% (in cases where the bound is very small it is difficult to achieve better precision than this). Note that the percentage approximation error bound depends on the state x so for the purposes of this section we consider the percentage bound evaluated at the entry state. For the computations we took the maximum achievable state,xmax, to be a state such that the expected number of visits of a firm usingμ was at most 10 −5 . In computing the bounds, we assumed that the maximum achievable state under the best response (non-oblivious) strategy was alsoxmax.
12 Note that the zero profits condition typically requires a fractional number of entrants to be satisfied exactly, so to accommodate this we instead randomized the number of entrants between the two neighboring integers. For example, if the equilibrium entry rate is 2.5, then the number of entrants is 2 or 3 with probability 0.5. Allowing for fractional numbers ensures existence of equilibrium. Note that with this entry process {st : t ≥ 0} also admits a unique invariant distribution.
Going one step further in reducing the variability of the industry dynamics, we tried shutting down entry and exit altogether and considered an industry with a fixed number of firms. We used error bound (4.6) in Theorem 4.3. See Figure 3 for the results. 13 For the low case the approximation error bound is less than 0.5% with just 5 firms, while for the high case it is 2% for 20 firms, and around 1% with 100 firms.
Most economic applications would involve from less than ten to several hundred firms. These results show that the approximation error bound may sometimes be small (<2%) in these cases, though this would depend on the model and parameter values for the industry under study.
Closeness to MPE Economic Indicators of Interest
Having gained some insight into what features of the model lead to low values of the approximation error bound, the question arises as to what value of the error bounds is required to obtain a good approximation of economic indicators like the ones researchers are usually interested on. To shed light on this issue we compare long-run statistics for the same industry primitives under OE and MPE strategies. A major constraint on this exercise is that it requires the ability to actually compute the MPE. With the current methods we are able to compute MPE for industries with a maximum of five to ten firms. Because we require the ability to compute equilibria for many different parameter values, to keep computation manageable we use four firms here. We therefore limit our analysis to the case of a fixed number of firms (no entry and exit), because only for that case were the approximation error bounds small under oblivious strategies (with only four firms). We use the same parameter specifications as in the previous subsection. Because of computational constraints in computing the MPE, we also impose a maximum state that a firm can reach of x max = 15, at which point investment is assumed to have no further effect. The market size is fixed, m = 30. 14 Recall that under OE strategies, the industry state is described by an ergodic Markov process (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007b) ). Under our assumptions, this is also true under MPE strategies (see also Ericson and Pakes (1995) ). Therefore, both systems have a well defined invariant distribution that describes their long-run behavior. We compare the expected values of several economic statistics of interest with respect to the OE and the MPE invariant distributions. The quantities compared are: average investment, average producer surplus, average consumer surplus, average share of the largest firm (C1), and average share of the largest two firms (C2). Table 1 reports these statistics for a wide range of parameters. The table also reports the maximum value (across all states) and weighted average value (according to the invariant distribution) of the approximation error bound, as well as the maximum and weighted av-erage of the actual benefit from deviating and keeping track of the industry state (the actual difference
). Note that the the latter quantity should always be smaller than the approximation error bound. In the results below we concentrate on the maximum values of these quantities.
The table is separated into two groups. The first five rows correspond to industries with a relatively low cost of investment (low value of d relative to θ 1 ). In these industries the industry state tends to have a symmetric distribution (see Figure 4) reflecting a rich investment process. The last five rows of the table correspond to industries with a relatively high cost of investment. In these industries the industry state tends to be skewed (see Figure 5) , reflecting low levels of investment.
From the computational experiments we conclude the following:
1. When the bound is less than 1% the long-run quantities estimated under OE and MPE strategies are very close.
2. Performance of the approximation depends on the richness of the equilibrium investment process.
When the bound is between 1-20% and there is a rich investment process, the long-run quantities estimated under OE and MPE strategies are still quite close. When the bound is above 1% and there is little investment, the long-run quantities can be quite different on a percentage basis (5% to 20%), but still remain fairly close in absolute terms (see Table 2 ).
3. The performance bound is not tight. For a wide range of parameters the performance bound is as much as 10 to 20 times larger than the actual benefit from deviating.
The previous results suggest that economic indicators of interest under MPE strategies are well-approximated with OE strategies when the approximation error bound is small (less than 1-2% and in some cases even up to 20 %). These results, together with those from Subsection 5.2, demonstrate that the OE approximation significantly expands the range of applied problems that can be analyzed computationally.
Aggregate Shocks
Our base model does not allow for shocks to firm profitability that are common across firms. In some contexts, for example when studying how industry dynamics evolve over a business cycle, it is important to account for aggregate shocks. In this section, we extend OE and our computational methods to allow for aggregate shocks at the expense of greater modeling and computational complexity.
In Section 6.1 we introduce a dynamic industry model with aggregate shocks. In Section 6.2 we extend the notion of OE to accommodate aggregate shocks. Error bounds for this model are introduced in Section 6.3.
Model with Aggregate Profit Shocks
In this section we extend the model in Section 2 to incorporate a profit shock, z t , that is common to all firms in the industry. z t might represent a common demand shock, a common shock to input prices, or a common technology shock. These common shocks will serve to generate periods over which profits are high (or low) for all firms in the industry simultaneously.
The following assumption defines the aggregate shock process and restates the assumptions on the profit function. 15 Assumption 6.1. Let Z = {z t ∈ A : t ≥ 0} be a stationary and irreducible Markov process, where A is a finite subset of N. Moreover, suppose that for some z ∈ A, P[z t+1 = z|z t = z] > 0. Single-period profits for firm i at time t are given by π(x it , s −i,t , z t ). For all z, π(x, s, z) satisfies Assumption 2.1. Additionally,
In this model, a strategy is a function µ(x, s, z) that depends on the firm's own state, the competitors' state and the level of the aggregate shock. An entry rate is a function, λ(s, z), that depends on the industry state and the level of the aggregate shock. To formalize these notions, let M z denote the set of exit/investment strategies such that an element µ ∈ M z is a pair of functions µ = (ι, ρ), where ι : N × S × N → + is an investment strategy and ρ : N × S × N → + is an exit strategy. We denote the set of entry rate functions by Λ z , where an element of Λ is a function λ : S × N → + .
Define the value function, V (x, s, z|µ , µ, λ), to be the expected net present value for a firm at state x when its competitors' state is s, and the value of the aggregate shock is z, given that its competitors each follow a common strategy µ ∈ M z , the entry rate function is λ ∈ Λ z , and the firm itself follows strategy µ ∈ M z . Because this definition is analogous to the one in Section 2.4, we omit the details here for brevity.
An equilibrium in this model comprises an investment/exit strategy µ = (ι, ρ) ∈ M z , and an entry rate function λ ∈ Λ z such that:
1. Incumbent firm strategies represent a MPE: s, z|µ, λ) ∀x ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S, ∀z ∈ A.
Oblivious Equilibrium With Aggregate Shocks
In this section we extend the notion of OE to incorporate aggregate shocks. Recall that an OE was based on the idea that when there are a large number of firms (and no aggregate shocks), simultaneous changes in individual firm quality levels can average out such that in the long-run the industry state remains roughly constant over time. Because the aggregate shocks are likely to be of first order importance to strategies, in extending the notion of oblivious strategies to this model it makes sense to make strategies a function of the current value of the shock. In this case, even if there are a large number of firms, the industry state will not necessarily be close to a constant state; it will move around with the aggregate shock. However, we can still take advantage of averaging effects among many firms to restrict firm's strategies so that they do not depend on the industry state. Actually, if there are many firms and the time period is large, because of averaging effects, firms should be able to accurately predict the industry state based on the entire history of realizations of the aggregate shock. This is computationally impractical; instead, we will allow firms to predict the industry state based on a finite set of statistics that depend on the history of realizations of the shock.
Based on this motivation, we will restrict firm strategies so that each firm's decisions depend only on the firm's quality level, the current value of the aggregate shock, and a finite set of statistics that depend on the history of realizations of the aggregate shock. We call such restricted strategies extended oblivious strategies. To convey this dependence we define the sequence {w t ∈ W = W 1 × ... × W N : t ≥ 0}, where W j are countable sets. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 6.2. We assume that {w t : t ≥ 0} is a stationary ergodic Markov process adapted to the filtration generated by {z t : t ≥ 0}. For all t ≥ 0, w t (1) = z t .
Note that the first part of Assumption 6.2 together with assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 6.1 imply that {(s t , w t ) : t ≥ 0} is also a stationary ergodic Markov process with a well defined invariant distribution.
LetM z andΛ z denote the set of extended oblivious strategies and the set of extended oblivious entry rate functions. If firm i uses strategy µ ∈M z then at time period t, firm i takes action µ(x it , w t ), where x it is the state of firm i at time t. Similarly, if λ ∈Λ z , then at time t, the entry rate is equal to λ(w t ). Since by the second part of Assumption 6.2, w t (1) = z t , firms keep track of the current level of the aggregate shock when making decisions with extended oblivious strategies. The state variables w t (2), ..., w t (N ) allow firms to incorporate additional information about the history of realizations of the aggregate shock into the strategies. This information could be useful to better predict the average industry state conditional on observing w t .
For example, suppose z t represents a demand shock that could take three values: {Low, M edium, High}.
Firms could try to predict the industry state based on the current level of the shock. However, the levels of the shocks observed during previous time periods provide additional information that is useful in forming this prediction. To improve the accuracy of the prediction of the industry state, firms could also keep track of the previous value of the aggregate shock. In general, accounting for past shocks will generally improve a firms decisions. It is worth mentioning here, though, that past aggregate shocks are not payoff-relevant (hence, they do not influence MPE strategies), so allowing extended oblivious strategies to depend on them may give rise to extended oblivious equilibria that are poor approximations to MPE. Different extended oblivious strategies can be defined depending on the specification of w t . We provide a few examples below. Both examples satisfy Assumption 6.2.
Example 6.1. Suppose that for j ∈ {1, ..., N }, w t (j) = z t−j+1 . Hence, w t = {z t , z t−1 , ..., z t−N +1 }; the aggregate shocks statistics correspond to the last realizations of the shock. In this case W is the set of feasible N -tuples of consecutive aggregate shock levels.
One disadvantage of the previous scheme is that realizations of the shock that appear in a certain window of time influence the strategy, but if a realization occurs even slightly outside this window, it has no influence.
With this motivation we introduce an alternative scheme based on exponentially weighted averages of past shocks.
Example 6.2. Suppose that w t (1) = z t and that for j ∈ {2, ..., N }, w t+1 (j) = α j g j (z t ) + (1 − α j )w t (j) and w 0 (j) = 0, where α j ∈ [0, 1] and g j : N → . 17
Suppose that all firms use a common strategy µ ∈M z and that entry occurs according to the entry rate function λ ∈Λ z . We assume that (s 0 , w 0 ) is distributed according to the invariant distribution of {(s t , w t ) : t ≥ 0}. Hence, (s t , w t ) is a stationary process.
Firms predict the industry state based on the current realization of w t . Accordingly, we defines µ,λ (w) = E [s t |w t = w]. In words,s µ,λ (w) is the long-run expected industry state when dynamics are governed by extended oblivious strategy µ and extended oblivious entry rate function λ, conditional on the current realization of w t being w.
With some abuse of notation we define an extended oblivious value function as,
This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of a firm that is at quality level x, when the aggregate shocks statistics have value w, and the firm follows extended oblivious strategy µ . The firm assumes that its competitors' state will bes µ,λ (w k ) for all time periods k.
An extended oblivious equilibrium consists of a strategy µ ∈M z and an entry rate function λ ∈Λ z that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Firm strategies optimize an extended oblivious value function:
In the Appendix, we also provide an algorithm for computing an extended OE. Note that the state space of the firm's dynamic programming problem scales with the number of firm states and with the size of W, the set of aggregate shock statistics. As the set W becomes richer, more computation time and memory is needed.
Error Bounds
We derive error bounds for this model. As before, approximation error is the amount by which a firm at state x ∈ N can improve its expected net present value by unilaterally deviating from the extended OE strategy, and instead following an optimal (non-oblivious) best response.
Because an optimal strategy for a firm that unilaterally deviates from an extended OE strategy depends on the aggregate shock statistics, (since its competitors are using extended OE strategies), we introduce extended Markov strategies. We define M ze and Λ ze as the set of extended Markov strategies and extended entry rate functions, respectively. An extended Markov strategy is a function of the firm own state, the industry state, the aggregate shock, and the aggregate shock statistics. If firm i uses strategy µ ∈ M ze then at time period t, firm i takes action µ(x it , s −i,t , w t ). Similarly, if λ ∈ Λ ze , then the entry rate at time t is λ(s t , w t ). 18
For extended Markov strategy µ , µ ∈ M ze and extended entry rate function λ ∈ Λ ze , with some abuse of notation, we define the extended value function,
where i is taken to be the index of a firm at quality level x at time t. With some abuse of notation, we define V (x, s, w|µ, µ, λ) = V (x, s, w|µ, λ). The extended value function generalizes the value function defined in Section 2.4 allowing for dependence on extended strategies. We use this value function to evaluate the actual expected discounted profits garner by a firm that uses an extended Markov strategy. We derive an error bound for this model.
Theorem 6.1. Let Assumptions 6.1, 6.2, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any extended OE (μ,λ), and firm state
where ∆ A π(s, w) = max y∈A (π(y, s, w(1)) − π(y,s µ,λ (w), w(1))), x(k) = max(x − (k − t)w, 0), and the expectations are taken over the invariant distribution of (s t , w t ).
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The bound can be computed using simulation. As before, this bound is quite general and does not rely on many of the detailed modeling assumptions. Finally, bounds that hold for fixed values of the aggregate shock (as oppose to averaging over them) can also be obtained.
Conclusions and Future Research
The goal of this paper has been to increase the set of applied economic problems that can be addressed using Ericson and Pakes (1995) -style dynamic models of imperfect competition. Due to the curse of dimensionality, existing dynamic programming methods have limited application of these models to industries with a small number of firms and a small number of states per firm. As an alternative, we proposed a method for approximating MPE behavior using an OE, where firms make decisions only based on their own state and the long run average industry state.
We introduced a simple algorithm to compute an OE. A nice feature of the method is that there is no need to place a' priori restrictions on the number of firms in the industry or the set of states that a firm can reach. As a result, computational considerations place very few constraints on model details.
To facilitate using OE in practice, we derived approximation error bounds that indicate how good the approximation is in any particular problem under study. These approximation error bounds are quite general and thus can be used in a wide class of models. Through computational experiments, we showed that OE often yields a good approximation of MPE behavior for industries like those that empirical researchers would like to study.
Even though the emphasis in this paper is on using OE to approximate industry dynamics, OE can also be used to approximate equilibria in more general stochastic games (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2005b) ).
While we believe that the concept of OE will be useful in applications on its own (see also Xu (2006) and Hashmi (2006)), we think that an important value of OE may come through some important extensions (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007a) ). In order to capture short run transitional dynamics that may result, for example, from shocks or policy changes, we have developed a nonstationary notion of OE in which every firm knows the industry state in the initial period but does not update this knowledge after that point. Additionally, in ongoing research, we are working on an extended notion of OE that allows for extension trades off increased computation time and memory for a better behavioral model and a better approximation to MPE behavior. Our hope is that the dominant firm OE will provide better approximations for more concentrated industries.
All aforementioned approximation methods are based on state aggregation. Each firm predicts expected discounted profits on partial information about the current state and uses a piecewise constant approximation to the value function. The broader approximate dynamic programming literature makes use of richer families of functions such as linear combinations of arbitrary basis functions and nonlinearly parameterized approximators. Another direction for future work is to explore the use of such approximations and various approximate dynamic programming algorithms to address EP-type models.
A Proofs and Mathematical Arguments
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any OE (μ,λ) and firm state
where
Proof. We derive the second bound, beginning with the following proposition. Let µ * ∈ M be a Markovian (non-oblivious) best response to an OE (μ,λ) for a firm that is keeping track of the industry state.
Proposition A.1.
Proof. Becauseμ andλ attain an OE, for all x,
where the last equation follows because there will always be an optimal oblivious strategy when optimizing an oblivious value function even if we consider more general strategies. It follows that,
The equation can be rewritten as:
is the probability firm i, currently in state x with competitors in state s, will be in state y and s , respectively, k − t periods from now.
We can write:
The last equation follows because rival firms use strategyμ, which only depends on their own state, and the entry rate isλ independent of the industry state. Substituting into equation (A.2) and using Fubini's theorem gives:
Note that we need to take the positive part of max y∈N (π(y, s ) − π(y,s)) to get the last inequality, because this term can be negative and
can be less than one.
Recall that q(s) is the invariant distribution of {s t : t ≥ 0}, where s t is the industry state at time t when every firms uses strategyμ and the entry rate isλ. Therefore, for any k ≥ t:
The first equation follows by Fubini and the second one by equation (A.4). The previous argument is valid for any x ∈ N, therefore:
where s t is a random vector distributed according to q.
Returning to the derivation of the bound, we have that:
The first term is bounded by the previous proposition. Let us analyze the second term:
The last equation follows by using Fubini's theorem and because under oblivious strategies firms' trajectories are independent. Multiplying each term by q(s), summing over all s ∈ S and interchanging sums in the right hand side using Fubini we obtain:
Finally, interchanging the sums
The second bound follows by equations (A.5), (A.8), and the proposition. The first one follows by a similar argument, but with the difference that we take max y∈N in equation (A.6) and we take absolute value of the difference of one period profits in equations (A.3) and (A.6).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any OE (μ,λ), firm state x ∈ N,
Because the quality level of a firm can change by at most w units per time period,
Multiplying by q(s), summing over all s ∈ S, and using Fubini's theorem we obtain:
The rest of the proof is analogous to Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Suppose that at time t = 0 there is a positive number of incumbent firms. Suppose that the sell-off value φ it = 0, ∀i, t, and that the entry cost
. Then, for any OE (μ,λ) and firm state x ∈ N,
Proof. The proof of the error bounds are analogous to the proofs of bounds 4.2 and 4.4, respectively. The only difference is that in equations (A.3) and (A.10), y P µ * ,μ,λ [x ik = y | s −i,k = s , x it = x, s −i,t = s] = 1 (as opposed to ≤ 1), so there is no need to take the positive part of ∆ · π(s ) to get the inequalities.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let Assumptions 6.1, 6.2, 2.2, and 2.3 hold. Then, for any extended OE (μ,λ), and firm state x ∈ N,
Proof. Let µ * be an optimal extended (non-oblivious) best response to an extended OE (μ,λ) for a firm that is keeping track of the industry state. Hence, µ * ∈ M ze is such that
We have that:
First, let us bound the first term in the right hand side of the previous equation.
Becauseμ andλ attain an extended OE, for all x, w,
where the last equation follows because there will always be an optimal extended oblivious strategy when optimizing an extended oblivious value function even if we consider extended Markovian strategies that keep track of the industry state. It follows that,
because, under extended OE strategies, (s −i,k , w k ) is independent of x it , conditional on (s −i,t , w t ). Hence,
Finally, multiplying by q(s, w), the invariant distribution of {(s t , w t ) : t ≥ 0}, and summing over all (s, w),
we obtain, E[V (x, s t , w t |µ * ,μ,λ) −Ṽ (x, w t |μ,λ)] ≤ 
B Algorithm for Computing Extended OE
In this section, we introduce a algorithm to compute extended OE. We define the following dynamic programming operator:
(T µ,λ V )(x, w) = π(x,s µ,λ (w), w(1)) + E max φ it , sup ι≥0 −dι + βE V (x i,t+1 , w t+1 ) x it = x, w t = w, ι it = ι , Note that for all µ ∈M z and λ ∈Λ z , there exists µ * ∈M z , such that, sup µ ∈MzṼ (x, w|µ , µ, λ) = V (x, w|µ * , µ, λ) =T µ,λṼ (x, w|µ * , µ, λ), ∀x ∈ N, w ∈ W (Bertsekas (2001)).
We introduce the following algorithm to compute an extended OE. At each iteration of the algorithm, we
(1) compute the expected industry state conditional on the shock statistics,s µ,λ (w) (step 5); (2) we compute the strategy that maximizes the extended oblivious value function 19 ; and (3) we compute new entry rates depending on the extent of the violation of the zero-profit conditions (step 18). Strategies and entry rates are n := n + 1
22:
µ := µ + (µ * − µ)/(n γ 1 + N 1 )
23:
λ := λ + (λ * − λ)/(n γ 2 + N 2 ) 24: until ∆ 1 ≤ 1 and ∆ 2 ≤ 2
We finish by suggesting a way of computings µ,λ (w) . Let p(x, w, y, w ) = Pμ ,λ [x i,t+1 = y, , w t+1 = w | x it = x, w t = w]. The probability that the firm exits from a state (x, w) is one minus the sum of transition probabilities from that state. Lets(x, w) be the x component ofs µ,λ (w). Let π(x, w) be the product ofs(x, w) and the steady state probability that the shock process is in state w, q(w). Then, π(x, w) satisfies the balance equations:
π(x, w) = (y,w ) π(y, w )p(y, w , x, w) + 1(x = x e ) w λ(w )q(w )p(w , w),
where p(w , w) = P [w t+1 = w | w t = w ] and 1 is the indicator function. We can obtain π(x, w) by solving this set of balance equations. We can also obtain steady state probabilities of the shock process by solving another set of balance equations. From these two objects, we obtains(x, w). Quality Level Expected Number of Firms
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